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Cu r r en t  A f f a i r s
“The Olympics are not an occasions for politics,”the Chinese authorities insisted throughout the2008 Beijing games, (1) yet the sports develop-
ment of New China has been a product of political manoeu-
vres from the outset. Recent issues of China Newsweek
(Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan) reveal this process while
describing China’s historical journey into The Bronze Age,
the Silver Age and the Golden Age, (2) — apparently named
after the trilogy by the renowned and defiant writer Wang
Xiaobo. How China has overcome obstacles and gradually
emerged triumphant is another hidden theme. (3) The series
marks a departure from the host of reports on the Olympics
through its examination of the actions of the state apparatus,
its focus on the lives of athletes in an evolving socioeconom-
ic context, and in offering a heuristic perspective on the
dynamics of sport. 
State participation in sport is not uncommon. (4) The point of
interest is how and why the state’s monopoly of sport — the so-
called “whole-nation support for the elite sport system” (Juguo
Tizhi) has been developed and sustained in China. China
Newsweek‘s series provides an orderly narrative with accompa-
nying commentary. Immediately after the Olympics, other
Chinese media followed up by deliberating over whether Juguo
Tizhi is appropriate. This review documents how these view-
points reflect positions and convictions relating to structural
reform. Once again, athletic contest serves as a platform for
discussing the feasibility and desirability of a political course.T he  Br onz e Age  (1949-1966)
The Bronze Age is divided into two parts. First, China’s top
leaders were convinced that athletic participation could
demonstrate progress in socialist society. The state began to
organise sporting activities and formulate the Juguo Tizhi.
Benefiting from the political machine, Chinese athletes
began to set records. Second, these athletic endeavours were
interrupted when the underlying political structure was
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Athletes became
victims of ideological struggle, and most of their careers were
terminated. In summation, it appears that during the Bronze
Age the prospect for sport, whether in recession or recovery,
was predetermined by the state’s orientation. 
In the early Republic’s era, sport was not differentiated from
physical education. Mao Zedong focused on the functional
role of physical culture in delivering his countrymen from
imperialistic and feudalistic hegemony. Little was mentioned
of fair competition as in the Western sporting tradition. (5)
Mao’s decision to mandate physical education as a core sub-
ject in schools served, however unintentionally, to store up a
pool of athletic resources for future use. (6) With the procla-
mation of the State Physical Culture and Sports
Commission (SPCSC) and the appointment of Marshal He
Long as founding minister, the general framework of China’s
sport system was established. (7) The core mission of the
SPCSC was to enable athletes to compete with past records
and against contemporary counterparts in order to demon-
strate the superiority of the socialist regime. (8) As He Long
remarked:
The Chinese people were called “the sick men of the
Far East” in the old society. Now Chinese people
have to stand up in the world. We should remove this
label. Who is going to do this? Athletics can under-
take this arduous but glorious task. As Communist
Party members, we should devote ourselves to build-
ing sport into an aspiration of the Chinese people. (9)
Orthodox discourse coupled with manoeuvring by the lead-
ership quelled intra-party opposition, but funding for sports
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was still far from adequate. With the new emphasis on ath-
letics, available resources were pulled into the more promis-
ing fields under central planning. Meanwhile, local authori-
ties were responsible for selecting promising children from
across the country for intensive training through various sport
commissions, academies, and schools. Only state-supported
athletic elites could represent the nation in national and
international competitions. These procedures and principles
formed the basis for Juguo Tizhi. (10) Table tennis, gymnas-
tics, shooting, and weight lifting, among others, seized the
opportunity to flourish. 
Those early successes, while setting numerous records,
bringing home enormous pride, and laying the foundation
for Juguo Tizhi, did not last long. The SPCSC became a
target of attack during the Cultural Revolution. Ideologically,
sport competitions were essentially vested in the internation-
al arena, and Juguo Tizhi was institutionally modelled along
Bolshevik lines, which meant interaction with hegemonic
capitalists and subordination to the revisionist Soviets. (11)
These orientations could not be more unacceptable to the
Red Guards. Strategically, political figures such as He Long
and the de facto director of Chinese sport, Rong Gaotang,
were obstacles to the Gang of Four’s quest for power. He
Long was tortured to death, and Rong was imprisoned for a
decade. (12) As a result, the glorious ideal of elite sport gave
way to mass physical education to promote the national
physique, and the lives of athletes, coaches, and sport cadres
became collateral damage. 
Nevertheless, it was the sport participants’ response to
tragedy rather than the tragedies per se that truly reveal the
attributes of the Bronze Age. For instance, Rong Gaotang,
the founding deputy of the SPCSC, was labelled an ultra-
revisionist and sentenced to eight years in prison and five
years of reform through labour (laogai) in 1966. (13) His first
major decision after rehabilitation in 1979 was to withdraw
to the backbench to facilitate the long-term development of
sport. (14) The first Chinese world champion, Rong Guotuan,
could not withstand the accusations of treason, and hanged
himself at the age of 31 on 20 June 1968. “I value my hon-
our more than my life,” he wrote in his suicide note. (15) Their
behaviour demonstrates a form of indoctrinated altruism that
was customary in an age when the meaning of individual
existence was bound up with duty and position in society. It
further reflects the limited range of choices available when
an individual’s vocation was entirely embedded in an arena
monopolised by the state. 
In other words, the value of championship lay in for whom
it was won, and not in who won it. Leaders’ salutes and cit-
izens’ honours were temporary expressions of love of coun-
try; prolonging them hinged on athletes’ complete submis-
sion to the state structure. The primary function of athletes
was to serve those political objectives. For that reason, all
glory vanished when Rong Guotuan’s patriotism was chal-
lenged. No verdict was necessary; suspicion was enough to
ruin him. Suicide became a legitimate choice to restore his
value by restoring the fidelity of national athletes. Not only
did the sacrifice completely exonerate him, it secured his sta-
tus as a hero in perpetuity. 
Perhaps the Cultural Revolution is still too sensitive of an
issue for China Newsweek to cover in detail, as a result of
which the borderline between the Bronze and Silver Age is
blurred. These tragedies truly revealed the humility of that
generation of athletes. Chen Jingkai, the first Chinese to
break a world record and who went on to break that record
nine more times, was prohibited from participating in the
Olympics; instead, he was deployed as a bench-worker dur-
ing the “Ten-Year Catastrophe.” (16) While coaching local
athletic teams for the rest of his life, he experienced the typ-
ical fallout of his contemporaries. Although they were reha-
bilitated, their youth and hence their utilitarian potential was
gone. Most spent their later years in humble circumstances.
The prospect of individual athletic endeavour was purely a
reflection of national sport development. The striking feature
was that individuals had no ability to influence those deci-
sions. T he  Si lv er  A ge (1966-198 6)
The ambiguous boundary between the Bronze Age and
Silver Age can be resolved by referring to a change in the
nature of sport. In the Silver Age, sport was transformed
from a tool for national emancipation to one for internation-
al diplomatic recognition. With the successful practice of
“Ping-Pong Diplomacy” (17) in the early 1970s, the utility of
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sport was restored. The subsequent triumphs of the
Women’s Volleyball Team (nüpai) brought national enthusi-
asm to a climax, consolidating the legitimacy of Juguo Tizhi,
which was credited with these achievements. At the same
time, overwhelming success in sports also developed a more
interactive and collaborative power structure between the
state apparatus, athletes, and people. 
The launch of Ping-Pong Diplomacy was the decision of
Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, targeting
budding Sino-US relations. (18) Their endorsement restored
the SPCSC, with Deng Xiaoping as its new minister. (19) In
March 1971, the National Table Tennis Team travelled to
Japan to participate in the 31st World Table Tennis
Championship. (20) Whether through mutual agreement or
unilateral concession, most of the games ended in a draw.
This result facilitated the propaganda bureau’s depiction of
the ice-breaking tour as “first on friendship, second on com-
petition.” (21) The US Table Tennis Team was granted per-
mission to visit Beijing in April the same year. They were
followed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and then
President Richard Nixon. (22) Thus China reopened its door
through creative use of sport. 
Although the ping-pong team turned the world upside down,
the real star of the 1980s was China’s volleyball team. A bil-
lion Chinese citizens who had never travelled abroad were
given a taste of “biting the foreigners” when the six-woman
volleyball team won five world championships in succession.
The so-called “spirit of the women’s volleyball team” (nüpai
jingshen) — indomitable courage, infinite vigour, solidarity,
and flexibility (23) — came at a moment when the country was
reconstructing its identity and searching for a new future under
the “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang) policy. The team
become the stuff of legend: “Long live the women’s volleyball
team!” (nüpai wansui), cried the people, (24) employing a slo-
gan that had previously been reserved for the nation, the
Party, and Chairman Mao. While general living standards in
China remained deficient, the team tasted affluence. The
people’s expectations and the justification for Juguo Tizhi
hinged on the team. Their coach, Yuan Waiman, enjoyed an
unprecedented promotion to deputy minister of the SPCSC,
and a brand-new training centre was built in Zhangzhou exclu-
sively for nüpai. Even red entrepreneurs such as Rong Yiren
and Henry Fok considered donations to nüpai legitimate
expressions of their love and support of the motherland. (25)
Nüpai jingshen provided the most concrete representation of
that most ambiguous concept: national identity. 
Neither their ping-pong contemporaries nor the athletes who
brought home the first world champion and the first
Olympic gold medal could compare with the popularity and
significance of the nüpai team. This phenomenon is anoth-
er trait of the Silver Age — a budding partnership between
athletes and people. By portraying the heroic status of ath-
letes and disseminating patriotic sentiment, the state appara-
tus implicitly delegated the power of interpretation to the
mass. Competition per se, rather than its deeper implica-
tions, was more eye-catching and became more prevalent
and relevant. In other words, although the agenda of using
sports to barter for national glory was consolidated, the ath-
letics power structure was slightly modified. In the Bronze
Age, sport development was based on hierarchical com-
mand. No one could dispute the order, or more accurately,
no one could consider the possibility of disputing it. Moving
into the Silver Age, the belief that every victory or defeat in
the international sports arena was a matter of concern to
every compatriot brought mass expectation into account and
made fame a valuable asset. Only one goal mattered: seize
the championship — for individuals, for the state, and for the
nation, and that goal could only be achieved through a part-
nership between the three. Thus, the partnership was a dou-
ble-edged sword that put pressure on one side and rewarded
the other. 
That dynamic power structure explains why most of the
members of the miraculous nüpai team ended up either
struggling in the business sector or climbing the political lad-
der. (26) Very few of them continued as sports professionals —
the most notable of these is Lang Pang, who crossed back
and forth across the border to coach Chinese, Italian, and
American national teams. (27) Her horizon and autonomy has
surpassed that of the former generation of athletes, who
stayed in the field through either submission to custom or
absence of choice. In summation, individual autonomy for
athletes of the Silver Age came only after they ceased par-
ticipating in sport. Even that marked significant progress,
126 N o  2 0 0 8 / 3
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however, compared with the former generation of athletes
who were recruited into, beaten out of, and then restored to
the sports arena. T he  Go lden Age  ( 198 7-2 007 ) 
The sensation and certainty of the Silver Age were replaced
by disappointment and doubt that marked the opening of the
Golden Age. Availed of the liberal thinking of the late
1980s, intellectual circles began questioning the relevance of
sport and whether the nation could bear unanticipated
defeat. The embarrassment of the national team in the
Seoul Olympics and the fall of “Ma’s Private Army” in track
and field proved that the intellectuals' foresight. The official
interpretation of the series of failures however, was not the
unfeasibility of Juguo Tizhi, but rather its inadequate capac-
ity. More resources were dragged into the system, ultimately
leading to the tour de force of the Beijing Olympics. 
When China’s economic reform encountered roadblocks in
the late 1980s, many Chinese looked to sport as a symbol of
China’s prospects. The people’s expectations ended in vain:
China dispatched its largest athletic team ever to the 1988
Seoul Olympics, but came home with only five gold
medals. (28) But the structure did not come under severe
scrutiny; only the participants were blamed. As the “Prince
of Gymnast” Li Ning recalled, “Chinese of that era needed
medals more than sports; the sports authorities wanted a
champion instead of an athlete.” (29)
The results of the Seoul Olympics and public opinion in its
aftermath matched the projections of Zhao Yu, author of the
reportage Strong Country Dream, who had criticised the
limited horizon and innate weakness of Juguo Tizhi. (30)
Published in Dangdai and widely accessible during the lib-
eral atmosphere of late 1980s, Zhao Yu’s article provoked
debate on a subject that had long been taken for granted.
On the one hand, the SPCSC condemned the report as
outrageous and unconstructive. Claiming that Juguo Tizhi
had proven to be the most effective way to mobilise athletes’
potential, and the fastest means of constructing a strong
nation, the sport giant insisted that the state-centric
approach must and would be preserved. (31) On the other
hand, the article’s first paperback edition recorded sales of
150,000 copies, (32) and People’s Daily and Guangming
Daily endorsed the article’s contribution in telling an uncom-
fortable truth. (33) Should a sports mechanism create more
injury than health? Could fair competition replace monop-
oly in the sports realm? Would athletic academies teach a
sport in which China had no comparative advantage? Could
athletics students be allowed a pure enjoyment of sport? (34)
These questions pinpointed structural constraints.
Meaningful discussion or even policy implications might
have developed further if not for the wrong timing immedi-
ately before Tiananmen. 
If Zhao’s article implies a correlation between China’s renais-
sance and its ideas of sport, then the rise and fall of “Ma’s
Private Army” demonstrates the collaboration of patriotic
sentiment with state capacity in the Chinese sports realm. 
Emerging at the fore of a track and field arena traditionally
dominated by the United States, Ma Junren’s team brought
immediate and far-reaching national attention. With a world
record followed by a world championship and then the first
Chinese Olympic gold medal in running, the “army” led by
Ma won a string of impossible missions. (35) His secret of suc-
cess was built simply and entirely upon Juguo Tizhi — the
selection of children with potential from cities and the coun-
tryside, followed by round-the-clock athletic training. (36) But
even while everyone was copying his tactics, celebrating his
successes, and looking forward to another triumph, a
“mutiny” began. The majority of Ma’s women’s team signed
a pledge to leave. The women insisted that it was not a mat-
ter of distribution of monetary reward or credit; they simply
could not tolerate Ma’s authoritarian rule. They wanted to
enjoy sport instead of being used as tools. (37) Others specu-
lated that Ma’s decision to relocate the training centre and
secure new sponsors had affected the benefits enjoyed by his
superiors in the provincial sport committee. Support from
municipal authorities and new financial sources could not
compensate for his diminished political ties in state athletic
circles. (38) Ma, his superiors, and his team, all fell victim to an
intense internal conflict within the monopolised sport system.
The outcome was as bad as could have been expected. 
Rising in stark contrast to the ideal function of sports, the
independent petition of these national heroes suffered a
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complete rejection by public opinion. Considered traitors to
their leader and their nation, they were abandoned regard-
less of their previous achievements. One of the three most
prominent members of the team ended up teaching athlet-
ics in a county primary school for $800 RMB per month,
while another struggled for subsistence as a mineworker. (39)
The third, recognising that returning to Ma’s team was the
only way to continue an athletic career, broke the pledge
and resubmitted herself to authority in order to secure a
decent living. (40)
Snubbing Zhao Yu’s intellectual challenge and the
autonomous appeals of Ma’s team members, the SPCSC
concluded that any drawbacks were caused by the incapaci-
ty, not the unfeasibility, of Juguo Tizhi, to be resolved
through a concrete blueprint and unlimited resources. “The
Glorious Olympics Plan” was initiated to ensure an annual
expansion of sport funding, an efficient direction of
resources to established fields, and a promise of a greater
number of gold medals in the upcoming Olympics. (41) This
was followed by a wave of outstanding performance in swim-
ming, shooting, diving, table tennis, badminton, gymnastics,
shooting, and weight lifting, starting from the late 1990s. (42)
China increased its gold medal count from 28 in the Sydney
Olympics to 32 in the Athens Olympics. (43) Juguo Tizhi had
restored its ability to fulfil national aspirations through
acquiring gold medals in the international athletic arena. 
Successful athletes became icons for national glory, enjoy-
ing unlimited monetary rewards and enviable careers. The
result has been a striving among parents for the opportuni-
ty to send their children to athletic schools, and a yearning
for fame and pride, while the state has utilised these accom-
plishments to trumpet national achievement and consolidat-
ed the legitimacy of the regime. Demand from large corpo-
rations, the emergence of private athletic schools, and gen-
uine interest from the public are new issues proposed by
new actors. Although everyone seems to be satisfied for the
time being, an implicit conflict between state control and
individual autonomy has emerged. This may be why China
Newsweek ended its 100-page report with a comment by
the famous gymnast Li Xiaoshuang: “My competition is a
process of capturing perfection…to an athlete, a gold medal
means nothing [but] temporary glory; I emphasise the spir-
it and virtue of sports.” (44)To wa r ds  a  New  Er a?  ( 2008-  )  
Passionate feelings rose to fanatical levels throughout the
Beijing Olympics, provoking significant comment, particularly
in the West, describing the Beijing games as a triumph for
Chinese nationalism and the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party. (45) There was general agreement that the
scale, budget, and enthusiasm surrounding the games were
unprecedented and could only occur in today’s China. At the
same time, many in the West expressed pride that liberal
democracy could not and would not apply such great effort to
the magnification of national prestige. (46) Some observers
expected a trend toward liberal democratic reform following
the Beijing Olympics, as occurred after the Tokyo and Seoul
games. (47) Proxies of the Chinese authorities, however, were
annoyed by the foreign media’s contemptuous attitude toward
their dedication and insisted on pursuing an alternative
path. (48) Zhang Yimou, the eminent film director and impre-
sario of the Olympics opening ceremony, admitted that the
arts need patronage. (49) In his view, artists, like athletes, need
to struggle against constraints on their autonomy, rather than
enjoying absolute freedom. (50) Subordination and compromise
are therefore tolerable if personal and national interests can be
served. In short, the Olympics turned into an occasion for an
exchange of manifestoes between the Chinese state and the
Western media, blocking channels for communication and dis-
cussion from the outset. While there has been debate on
grand narratives, a number of Chinese media organisations,
contrary to the Western image of serving as mouthpieces for
the propaganda bureau, were keen on the undertake a
detailed review of the system that produced this glory and
pride. Journalists, scholars, athletes, and officials have contin-
ued to deliberate on the possibility of reform in sports.
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Lu Yuanzhen, the director of the review committee of the
General Administration of Sport (GAS, formerly SPCSC),
implies that tolerance towards track star Liu Xiang’s last-
minute withdrawal from the Beijing games signified maturi-
ty on the part of the general public. (51) “People are turning
toward a popular cultural enjoyment of sport instead of a
nationalistic pursuit of gold medal,” he adds. (52) Whether
this attitude is reflected in popular discourse is highly debat-
able, but a group of journalists has latched onto this narra-
tive. (53) In addition, the extraordinary success of the Beijing
Olympics has produced a favourable environment for
reform, (54) as a number of structural problems in the current
system have become evident. For instance, the GAS’s dual
role of both running and monitoring sports has often led to a
conflict of interest. (55) Scholars and journalists also criticise
the outdated professional training system. Under the current
mechanism, state-funded professional athletes are denied
access to formal education, which makes their post-athletic
lives very difficult, and amateur athletes are prohibited from
participating in the Olympics, regardless of their talents. (56)
Furthermore, the selective funding and training mechanism
has caused unbalanced development between different kinds
of sport. Skill-oriented sports in which China has a compara-
tive advantage are promoted over physique-oriented sports,
where Chinese people are relatively weaker. (57) Although
numerous functional and conceptual constraints of the system
have been addressed, the overwhelming logic of gradualism
dominates the deliberation process. Wei Jizhong, the former
secretary general of the Chinese Olympics Committee,
stresses that China’s experience has proved that gradual
reform is better than shock therapy. (58) Any reform in Juguo
Tizhi is thus likely to tend more toward complementary than
replacement. 
That paradigm has come under greater scrutiny recently. Hu
Shuli, the chief editor of Caijing magazine, has proclaimed
that now is the right time for the phasing out of Juguo
Tizhi. (59) Whether the cost of producing one gold medal is
70 million or 700 million RMB, it is still too enormous for
society to bear. Besides, the relative cost of producing a gold
medal will inevitably surpass its relative benefit, Hu
insists. (60) Hu enjoys more journalistic flexibility of opinion
than the establishment camp. Recognising that the structur-
al constraints of Juguo Tizhi will constantly mobilise and
inefficiently utilise resources, as in the case of planned econ-
omy, Hu advocates a complete renovation of the structure to
take account of the genuine economic value of sport.
Apart from the utilitarian concerns of this leading Chinese
economic magazine, prominent participants in the field are
demonstrating and promoting their alternative paths through
a series of reports from influential Chinese journals such as
Southern Weekend (Nanfang zhoumo) and Oriental
Outlook (Liaowang dongfang zhoukan). (61) As a basket-
ball player, Yao Ming is unlikely to receive any Olympic gold
medals, but he remains an icon for a distinguished Chinese
athletic career. Under the current structure, national athletes
need to take part in numerous tours and join national com-
petitions typically aimed at raising funds and increasing pub-
lic exposure. Complete subordination to such practices can
only shorten an athlete’s professional life and hinder optimal
development. (62) In Yao’s view, “My athletic career is vested
in my skills, my economic value, and my resume in the
NBA. Being a member of the national team is only one
component.” (63) Personal ambitions will not necessarily con-
flict with national interests if both sides have the capacity
and desire for mutual accommodation. The underlying ques-
tion is if the authorities can accept negotiation instead of
command as their dominant strategy. 
Formerly the most deified national hero and now the coach
for the American volleyball team, Lang Pang’s experience is
both symbolic and controversial. According to Lang Pang,
Americans honour the participation process while Chinese
are only concerned with the outcome; Chinese willingly
obey any absurd order from their superiors, while
Americans have a greater capacity for making an independ-
ent judgment on whether to follow an order or not. (64) Her
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comments, like Yao’s example, reveal a cleavage between
Western liberal values and Chinese collective custom.
However ambiguous and dubious these generalisations
about culture and athletic spirit might be, they powerfully
and effectively dominate the current discourse. 
This Oriental-Occidental cleavage reveals a fundamental
premise for China’s sport renaissance. Although the embed-
ded ideal of sports is national emancipation, the target audi-
ence has always included foreigners. This is not a contradic-
tion in terms, but rather signifies that genuine salvation
requires external recognition. The strategy of not making
indigenous martial arts (wushu) an item in national compe-
titions as long as it is not an item in the Olympics is thus
understandable. (65) The Chinese state and public have thus
given heavy weight to foreign responses throughout the
games. 
The debate also highlights the correlation between review-
ing state involvement in sport and initiating structural reform
in China. (66) Of course, the underlying cause and objective
of these media critics are quite similar to those of the state,
i.e. fulfilling a national dream separate from the single-mind-
ed pursuit of liberal democratic values, while allowing the
path and content of that dream to go beyond the dictates of
official stand and state structure to celebrated freedom of
expression and autonomous decision-making. Essentially,
they differentiate the interests and prestige of a nation from
the prerogatives and rights of a nation’s citizens, and advo-
cate the latter as a feasible and desirable middle course. •
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